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Abstract
It is time–long past time–for the United States to join the growing international consensus that
words like “due process,” “fair hearing,” “equal protection of the laws,” and “equality before the
law,” all express a universal principle–a right to equal justice to be enjoyed by everyone. And, as
the European Court on Human Rights pointed out, if this right is to be “practical and effective,”
and not merely “theoretical or illusory,” then for those unable to afford counsel, the right to equal
justice must include the right to a lawyer supplied by government. Why is this so important? As
the European Ministers said in 1978, it is “an essential feature of any democratic society.” Indeed,
without this right a nation’s poor people are less than full citizens and that nation is less than a
true democracy. They cannot even enforce the other rights their votes may have won them in the
legislatures. It is the failure of the United States’ past we did not recognize this obvious truth,
so deeply embedded in our national ideals, long ago. It is the tragedy of the present we remain
insular and smug about our nation’s superiority in all things related to “justice,” while millions of
poor U.S. citizens are denied this precious right. It is the hope of the future the United States will
finally open its eyes and embrace the “practical and effective” right to equal justice most Western
democracies now guarantee. When that day comes–and it may come soon–millions of U.S. citi-
zens will, for the first time, truly have their day in court.
The United States will never have adequate government funding of civil legal services unless,
and until, there is an earth change in the nation’s understanding of what constitutes adequate fund-
ing of this fundamental government function. This conference is so important to the United States
because it gives us a chance to look at some comparable industrial democracies and how they
have treated the goal of equal access to justice for their lower income citizens. I have studied the
subject of equal access to justice for the poor for almost three decades and am delighted it finally
has begun to arouse some interest in the United States.
EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE:
COMPARING ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN
THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES
Justice Earl Johnson, Jr.
In 1997, Judge Robert Sweet of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York delivered the Leslie H. Arps
Memorial Lecture to the New York Bar Association. He asked
and answered a fundamental question,
What then needs doing to help the courts maintain the
confidence of the society and to perform the task of insuring
that we are a just society under a rule of law? ... To short-
hand it, we need a civil Gideon,' that is, an expanded constitu-
tional right to counsel in civil matters. Lawyers, and lawyers
for all, are essential to the functioning of an effective justice
system, 2
There is some irony-and also an indication of the implica-
tions of U.S. citizens still lacking a right to counsel in civil
cases-in the fact that in 1999 Judge Sweet's former law firm,
where he spent his pre-bench career, earned over three times
the entire budget of the Legal Services Corporation ' ("LSC"). A
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. Robert W. Sweet, Civil "Gideon" and justice in the Trial Court (The Rabbi's Beard), 42
THE RECORD 915, 924 (Dec. 1997).
3. About Legal Services Corporation (visited Jul. 29, 2000) <http://www.lsc.gov> (on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter About LSCI. Legal Services
Corporation ("LSC") is a private, non-profit corporation established by Congress in
1974 to assure equal access to justice under the law for all U.S. citizens. An 1 1-member
bipartisan Board of Directors appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate
heads it. LSC does not provide services directly. Rather, it provides grants to indepen-
dent local programs chosen through a system of competition. In 1997, [SC funded 269
local programs. Local programs are independent entities, governed by Boards of Direc-
tors drawn from the local bar and client community. Programs may supplement their
[SC grants with additional funds from state and local governments, Interest on Lawyer
Trust Accounts ("IOLTA") programs, other federal agencies, bar associations, and
other charitable organizations. They also involve private attorneys through volunteer
pro bono work. LSC-funded programs do not handle criminal cases, nor do they accept
fee-generating cases that private attorneys are willing to accept on a contingency basis.
In addition, in 1996 a series of new limitations were placed upon activities in which
LSC-funded programs may engage on behalf of their clients, even with non-LSC funds.
Among them are prohibitions on class actions, challenges to welfare reform, collection
of attorneys' fees, rulemaking, lobbying, litigation on behalf of prisoners, representa-
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single law firm, which represents maybe a hundred or so corpo-
rate clients, earned US$1,000,000,000 (one billion)4 while the
U.S. Federal government was only willing to spend
US$300,000,000 (300 million) on legal services for forty million
poor U.S. citizens. Even adding in Interest on Lawyer Trust Ac-
counts5 ("IOLTA") and other federal, state, and local funding,
the most recent LSC annual report found the U.S. federal, state,
and local governments in total supplied less than
US$600,000,000 (600 million) for civil legal services.6
A half dozen law firms in the United States each took in
more than the US$600,000,000 (600 million) that the U.S. fed-
eral, state and local governments now spend on legal representa-
tion for the poor.7 In 1998, another revealing comparison
showed that the hundred largest law firms had combined reve-
nues that exceeded US$25,000,000,000 (twenty-five billion)
while the LSC budget that year was under US$300,000,000 (300
million)--or just a bit over 1% of what those hundred corporate
firms earned. The total U.S. government expenditures on civil
legal services for the poor amounted to only 2% of what the hun-
dred largest law firms took in.
I am not criticizing these law firms for being prosperous,
but I am criticizing the U.S. government for being penurious.
Even worse, the U.S. government is being penurious about what
Reginald Heber Smith called the "cornerstone" of U.S. democ-
racy-equal justice for all, irrespective of means.9
Before venturing beyond the shores of the United States, I
would like to share a couple of other disturbing comparisons. At
its peak in 1981, the LSC budget of US$321,000,000 (321 mil-
lion) represented 1.3% of the US$23,700,000,000 (23.7 billion)
tion in drug-related public housing evictions, and representation of certain categories
of aliens.
4. Roger Parloff, Skadden: A Flexible Firm Breaks the Billion Dollar Barrier, AM. L~w.
July 2000, at 88.
5. See Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1998)
(describing Interest On Lawyer Trust Accounts).
6. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT [hereinafter LSC ANNUAl_
REPORT]. The LSC Annual Report reflects local legal service agencies received a com-
bined total of US$486,000,000 (486 million) in federal, state, local, and IOLTA funds in
FY 1998. Including foundation grants and other private donations those agencies re-
ceived a total Of US$561,000,000 (561 million) in that fiscal year.
7. Parloff, supra note 4.
8. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, 1998 BUDGET.
9. REGINALD HERBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR (1919).
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that the people of the United States spent that year on lawyers.' °
Now, two decades later, the combined U.S. governmental ex-
penditures on civil legal services for the poor-US$600,000,000
(600 million)-represent only 0.5% of the more than
US$130,000,000,000 (130 billion) the people of the United
States currently spend on lawyers.1 This does not exactly
demonstrate progress-from an inadequate 1.3% down to a dis-
mal 0.5%. Indeed, it shows a precipitous 65% decline in the
share of legal resources devoted to the poor in the united States
over the past two decades.
Nonetheless, US$600,000,000 (600 million) may sound like
a lot of money to a U.S. audience and especially to legal services
advocates accustomed to seeing civil legal services treated as a
third class afterthought to the U.S.justice system rather than the
essential and integral component it should be. But,
US$600,000,000 (600 million) is a vast improvement only in the
sense a five-dollar bill seems like a fortune to a homeless beggar
who has grown accustomed to dimes and quarters.
I. A HUMBLING JOURNEY: WHAT ONE AMERICAN LEARNED
WHILE STUDYING EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN
OTHER WESTERN DEMOCRACIES
The United States will never have adequate government
funding of civil legal services unless, and until, there is an earth
change in the nation's understanding of what constitutes ade-
quate funding of this fundamental government function. This
conference is so important to the United States because it gives
us a chance to look at some comparable industrial democracies
and how they have treated the goal of equal access to justice for
their lower income citizens. I have studied the subject of equal
access to justice for the poor for almost three decades and am
delighted it finally has begun to arouse some interest in the
United States.
In 1973, only a few years after completing my tenure as di-
rector of the Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic
Opportunity ("OEO"), I first began researching civil legal ser-
10, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1993 tbl. 1327 (116th ed. 1996).
11. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 2000 tbl. 1301 (120th ed. 2000).
S8520001
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vices in other countries. While at OEO, I had seen the OEO
Legal Services Program increase the U.S. investment in civil legal
services for the poor by eightfold-from the US$5,000,000 (five
million) it had been for the entire United States under charita-
bly financed legal aid to over US$40,000,000 (forty million) in
federal funding. 2
I approached our research into other countries' legal ser-
vices efforts with a typically chauvinistic attitude. Like most U.S.
citizens, I assumed the United States had the most commitment
to equal justice for its citizens of any nation in the world. After
all, the U.S. national rhetoric is replete with guarantees the
United States provides equal justice. The Pledge of Allegiance
that U.S. children start reciting in kindergarten says the United
States is a country "with ... justice for all," not just for those who
can afford lawyers. The U.S. Constitution purports to guarantee
"due process" and "equal protection of the laws." 3 The en-
trance frieze of the U.S. Supreme Court building bears the
promise of "Equal Justice Under Law," which appears constantly
on television and other media. Given these constant reassur-
ances about the U.S. commitment to equal justice, it is no sur-
prise to find public opinion polls show four out of five U.S. citi-
zens erroneously believe poor people already enjoy a constitu-
tional right to free counsel if they are sued in a civil case, just as
they would if prosecuted in a criminal case.14
While unlike most U.S. citizens, I knew there was no right to
counsel in civil cases, I nevertheless assumed the United States
was well ahead of other countries when it came to providing law-
yers to those who could not afford their own. In some ways, my
beliefs were confirmed. For the relative few poor U.S. citizens
who could get legal representation in the United States, our re-
search demonstrated this representation generally was cost-effec-
12. By the way, that US$40,000,000 (forty million) in 1967 dollars is the equivalent
of about US$120,000,000 (120 million) in current dollars.
13. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment says in part: "No
State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
14. See ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL I-A,AuRS OF AMERicA, 1991-1992 DESK REFERENCE SUP-
PLEMENT: COMMEMORATING THE 200'" ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS (1991). This poll surveyed a national sample. A similar poll conducted that
same year in California found 69% of Californians entertained the same erroneous
belief that government guaranteed free lawyers for poor people in civil cases. California
State Legal Knowledge Poll, 1 CALIF. LAW. 35 (1991).
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tive and of high quality."
But if the quality was high, the quantity was low compared
to many industrial democracies. Let me begin with the legal
guarantee, what we call the "right to counsel." While the United
States has had a guaranteed right to counsel in criminal cases
since 1963, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Gideon v.
Wainwright,16 there is no such right for civil cases. No U.S. fed-
eral court has declared such a right as a matter of constitutional
law. A constitutional right to counsel exists only in a few states'
constitutions and, even in those states, in only a very narrow
range of cases. The U.S. federal government, furthermore, has
not created a statutory right to counsel in civil cases. At the U.S.
state government level, a statutory right to counsel exists in only
a few select states and only in limited categories generally revolv-
ing around the parent-child relationship.
For the most part, no poor U.S. citizen has a constitutional
or statutory right to the assistance of counsel for civil litigation in
either the U.S. Federal or state courts. This situation is all the
more surprising since equal justice, and the programs necessary
to implement it, occupy a unique status among the many social
programs and other goals the U.S. government is asked to pur-
sue. Admittedly, many of the others like health care, food
stamps, social security, and the like, address more immediate
physical needs. Equal justice, unlike these others, however, is at
the essential core of the U.S. system of government itself. Equal
justice can be found in the language of the U.S. constitution, the
political philosophy underlying the U.S. constitution, and the
common law legal tradition from which the U.S. legal system
sprung.
When I began researching other legal aid systems in 1973, 1
was shocked to learn that, somehow, other nations also commit-
ted to democracy had recognized the critical importance of
equal justice and assigned it a much higher priority. Frequently,
these nations have given a different, broader interpretation to
equivalent language found in their constitutions and other polit-
ical documents. Furthermore, their legislatures have been more
15. See MAURO CAPPELLETTI ET AL., TOWARD EQUALJUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES 140-66 (1975).
16. 372 U.S. 335.
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willing to enact legislation guaranteeing equal access to justice
for their low-income citizens.
A rather abbreviated version of the right to equal justice
came over to the United States from the United Kingdom along
with the rest of the common law legal system. At the time the
colonists were settling North America, this right already had ex-
isted under the English common law for several hundred years.
In 1495 during the reign of Henry VII, the English Parliament
enacted a statute guaranteeing free counsel and waiving all fees
for indigent civil litigants in the common law courts. 7 Judicial
decisions soon extended this right to the courts of equity also.' 8
The "Statute of Henry VIP " created a right to free counsel for
indigent English litigants and empowered the courts to appoint
lawyers to provide the representation, without compensation.
Many U.S. states imported this statute with its judicial elabora-
tions, along with the rest of English common law, into their own
common law when those states were first founded. Indeed over
three-quarters of a century ago, the California Supreme Court
used this five hundred-year old English statute as the legal basis
for its decision creating informa pauperis rights to waiver of court
fees and costs when poor litigants seek access to the civil
courts.20
Curiously, neither California courts nor the courts of other
states with similar provisions incorporating the English common
law recognized that the Statute of Henry VII provided for not
only the waiver of fees and costs, but also provided for appoint-
ment of free legal counsel for those same poor civil litigants.
Nonetheless, the existence of this right for some 500 years in the
nation that is the source of so many of the principles on which
the U.S. government is founded underscores the longstanding
and fundamental nature of the claim that free counsel should be
a matter of right for poor people in the United States. Signifi-
cantly, this right predates by centuries many of the social and
economic services, such as health care for the poor and old age
and disability income security, which have recently become
rights in the United States and most industrial democracies.
17. Statute of Henry VII, 11 Hen. 7, ch, 12.
18. See, e.g. Oldfield v. Cobbett, 41 Eng. Rep. 765 (1845).
19. 11 Hen. 7, ch. 12.
20. Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289 (1919),
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Most other Western European countries, like the United
Kingdom, enacted a statutory right to counsel in civil cases over
a century, or at least decades, ago. France enacted such a right
in 1851; Germany in 1877; the Scandinavian countries and most
other Northern European nations in the early 2 0th Century. Aus-
tria, Greece, Italy, and Spain enacted statutory rights to counsel
in the late 19h or early 2 0 th Century. In the 1960s and 1970s
several members of the U.K. Commonwealth including Hong
Kong, New Zealand, and some Australian states and Canadian
provinces followed suit.2 1
Beyond the United Kingdom and the common law world,
the interpretations U.S. courts have accorded constitutional due
process and equal protection guarantees stand in sharp contrast
to the treatment similar constitutional language has received at
the hands of the high courts in several other industrial demo-
cratic civil law countries. In 1937, over sixty years ago and a
quarter century before our own Supreme Court decided Gideon
v. Wainwright,22 a poor person asked the Supreme Court of Swit-
zerland to rule whether indigent Swiss citizens have a right to
free counsel in civil cases under that nation's Federal constitu-
tion.23 The Swiss constitution contains a guarantee that, "All
Swiss are equal before the law,"2 4 which is similar to the U.S.
constitution's guarantee that its citizens will enjoy "equal protec-
tion of the laws." In Schefer gegen Appenzell A. Rh. Ragierungsrat,25
the Swiss Supreme Court concluded poor people could not be
"equal before the law" in the regular courts unless they had law-
yers just like the rest of the citizenry.26 Consequently, it held the
governments of the Swiss Cantons were required to provide free
lawyers to indigent litigants in all civil cases requiring "knowl-
edge of the law."27
21. See CAPPELLETrI ET AL., supra note 15; Earl Johnson, Jr. The Right to Counsel in
Civil Cases: An International Perspective, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 341 (1985).
22. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
23. Schefer gegen Appenzell A. Rh. Ragierungsrat, Judgment of Oct. 8, 1997, BGE
63 la 209 [hereinafter Schefer).
24. BV [Constitution] art. 4 (Switz.).
25. Schefer, BGE 63 1 209.
26. See Francis William O'Brien, Why Not Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases? The Swiss
Approach, 28 OHio ST. L.J. 1, 5 (1967) (providing partially translation and discussion of
Schefer).
27. Id. Interestingly, it was 1972 before the Swiss Supreme Court extended this
liberal right to counsel to criminal cases. See CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 15, at 706.
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Germany has a comprehensive statutory right to counsel in
civil cases heard in the regular courts.28 Nonetheless, the Ger-
man Constitutional court also has made it clear that nation's
constitutional guarantee of a "fair hearing" in civil cases may re-
quire appointment of free counsel for poor people where the
legal aid statute does not.
29
The Swiss and German right to counsel decisions pale in
significance, however, compared to a 1979 decision of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, called Airey v. Ireland .3  This
landmark opinion emerged from the case of an indigent Irish
woman who sought judicial separation from her husband. Mrs.
Airey lacked the resources to hire a lawyer to represent her in
this proceeding. She asked the trial court to provide free coun-
sel, but the judge turned her down. Mrs. Airey appealed this
denial to the highest court in Ireland and lost. That result
would have been the end of the matter in the United States, be-
cause the highest court in the land had spoken. Ireland, how-
ever, is a signatory to the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms31 (European Convention) so
Mrs. Airey had recourse to a higher court and a higher law. In
front of the European Court of Human Rights, she won.
The European Convention does not guarantee indigent liti-
gants a right to free counsel in so many words. Article 6 of the
European Convention, however, does guarantee all civil litigants
a "fair hearing.1 2 In the course of its opinion in Airey, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights issued an unusually powerful state-
ment about government's affirmative obligation to provide equal
access to justice for lower income citizens:
The Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are
28. § 114 Btigerliches Gestzbuch [BGB] (F.R.G.) translated in CAPPEI.LEI-rI F.1 AL,
supra note 15, at 387 (stating "A party who is unable to defray the costs of the litigation
without jeopardy to the means necessary for his and his family's sustenance shall be
granted legal aid upon application therefore.").
29. Decision of June 17, 1953 (No. 26), Entscheidungen des Bundesgerfassung-
sgerichts [BverwGE] 2, 336 (1953).
30. 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).
31. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, E.T.S. No. 0005, entered into force Sep. 3, 1953 (visited
Jul. 29, 2000) <http://convention.coe.int> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal) [hereinafter European Convention].
32. Id. art. 6 §1. Article 6 guarantees that "[i]n the determination of his civil rights
and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time." Id.
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theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective.
This is particularly so of the right to access to the courts in view
of the prominent place held in a democratic society by the right
to a fair trial .... The court concludes ... that the possibility to
appear in person before the [trial court] does not provide the
applicant with an effective right of access .... There has accord-
ingly been a breach of Article 6 section 1.
The [Irish] Government maintain that ...in the present
case there is no positive obstacle emanating for the State and no
deliberate attempt by the State to impede access; the alleged
lack of access to the court stems not from any act on the part of
authorities but solely from Mrs. Airey's personal circumstances, a
matter for which Ireland cannot be held responsible under the
Convention.
[T] he Court does not agree .... In the first place, hin-
drance in fact can contravene the Convention just like a legal
impediment. Furthermore, fulfillment of a duty under the
Convention on occasion necessitates some positive action on
the part of the State; in such circumstances, the State cannot
simply remain passive and 'there is... no room to distinguish
between acts and omissions.' The obligation to secure an ef-
fective right of access to the courts falls into this category of
duty.33
Contrast that language from the opinion of the European
Court on Human Rights with what the U.S. Supreme Court said
just two years later, in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,3 4 a 5-
4 decision addressing the same issue of whether civil litigants
have a constitutional right to counsel. The majority of the high-
est U.S. court wrote, "the Court's precedents speak with one
voice about what 'fundamental fairness' has meant when the
Court has considered the right to appointed counsel, and we
thus draw from them the presumption that an indigent litigant has a
right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of
his physical liberty. It is against this presumption that all the other
elements in the due process decision must be measured ....
So the constitutional right to a "fair hearing" in Western Eu-
rope requires those governments to provide free counsel to poor
33. Airey, 32 Eur. Ct. H.K. (ser. A).
34. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
35. Id.
20001
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people in civil cases. By contrast, the constitutional right to "due
process" in the United States does not impose such a require-
ment. Somehow legal representation is essential to fundamental
fairness in Western Europe but not in the United States. 6
Were the United States a signatory to the European Conven-
tion, it would violate the "fair hearing" guarantee of that Con-
vention since the United States fails to guarantee free counsel to
poor people in civil cases. Most of the western industrial democ-
racies outside the United States have signed the European Con-
vention and are bound by Airey v. Ireland. 7 Thus, the poor peo-
ple of nearly all the western industrial democracies enjoy a
supra-national constitutional right to counsel in civil cases. To
put it another way, poor U.S. citizens are nearly alone among the
poor people of the western industrial world in not having this
basic right of democratic citizenship. That thought seems rather
sobering and, indeed, is a major embarrassment in a country
which prides itself as the home of 'Justice for All."
Turning from the legal entitlement to counsel to the level
of government investment, it undoubtedly would come as a sur-
prise to most U.S. citizens to learn where the United States ranks
compared to many Western European and Commonwealth
countries of the United Kingdom when it comes to public invest-
ment in civil legal services for those unable to afford counsel.
When I first took a look at this question in 1974, 1 found the
United States already was lagging behind the few industrial de-
mocracies from which we could acquire reliable budget informa-
tion. The United Kingdom was already spending three times as
much per capita on civil legal services as the United States, even
after the dramatic increase brought about by the OEO Legal Ser-
vices Program and the first U.S. federal funding of civil represen-
tation for the poor. Meanwhile in 1974, the Swedish legal aid
program was spending four times as much and the brand new
program in Quebec province, Canada was spending four-and-a
half times as much per capita as the United States was on civil
legal services.
36. Incredibly smart, these Americans. Even those with only a grade school or high
school education learn enough about civil procedure, trial practice, and the substantive
law to represent themselves in court, while Europeans need the help of lawyers to do
the same.
37. Airey, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A). See European Convention, supra note 31 (list-
ing 41 member states as signatories).
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TABLE 1. COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON
CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES IN 1974 (in 1974 U.S. Dollars) (United
Kingdom, Sweden, Quebec Province (Canada), and United States) 8
Total U.S. budget
Total Government Per capita required to match
spending on civil government the per capita
legal services Population spending on civil spending (US$
(US$ million) (millions) legal services million)
United
Kingdom 52.5 45 1.07 230
Sweden 10 8 1.20 280
Quebec
Province,
Canada 8 6 1.25 300
United States 75 230 .34
A year later, the U.S. Congress created the LSC to take over
the civil legal services structure the OEO Legal Services Program
had started. 39 By 1981, the budget the LSC inherited had ex-
panded by almost five fold-to US$321,000,000 (321 million).
In that year, for the first and only time the United States nearly
closed the gap in per capita funding with the United Kingdom
and several other comparable industrial democracies. Since
1981, however, that gap has grown each and every year. In most
Northern European and U.K. Commonwealth countries, includ-
ing Canada, government spending on civil legal services grew
steadily-in a few, exponentially-during the final two decades
of the 20th Century. Many are spending five to ten times as much
on civil legal services in 2000 as they did in 1980.
By contrast, U.S government funding was cut sharply in
1982 and has never recovered. Twenty years later, the LSC
budget still has not returned to the US$321,000,000 (321 mil-
lion) level of 1981 even in current dollars. In real terms, the
present LSC budget is less than half what it was twenty years ago.
As mentioned earlier, according to the latest LSC annual report,
even adding in IOLTA and other federal and state funding, com-
bined government expenditures on civil legal services in the
United States only totaled US$536,000,000 (536 million) in 1998
and the combined government expenditure probably remains
38. CAPPELLETTi ET AL., supra note 15, at 234.
39. See About LSC, supra note 3.
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under US$600,000,000 (600 million) in 2000.4'
Roughly a quarter century after the comparisons I first
made between legal services expenditures in the United States
and other countries, here are the current facts-after a down-
ward drift in this country and substantial to dramatic expansion
elsewhere. Table 2 compares the same four countries as I com-
pared in 1974.
TABLE 2. COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON
CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES IN 1990s (United Kingdom, Sweden,
Quebec Province (Canada), and United States)
Total U.S. budget
Total Gov't. Per capita gov't. required to match
spending on civil spending on civil this nation's per
legal services Population legal services capita spending
(US$ million) (millions) (US$) (US$ billion)
England &
Wales 1,340 5.3 26.00 1.7
Sweden 59 9 6.55 1.7
Quebec
Proince,
Canada 52 7 7.40 2.0
United States 600 270 2.25 0.6
Going beyond per capita expenditures on civil legal ser-
vices, the chart below compares the United States with several
other industrial democracies-from Europe, North America,
and Oceania-using a yet more telling measure, relative com-
mitment to equal access to justice for all. Since these jurisdic-
tions vary so widely in population size and per capita income, the
nations are ranked by the proportionate share of their Gross Na-
tional Product ("GNP") they devote to this fundamental govern-
ment function. In all cases, the statistics reflect total governmen-
tal expenditures on civil legal services for some annual period in
the 1990s-the most current year for which I have been able to
obtain this data for the nation involved. With the exception of
France (1994) and Germany (1996), the expenditure data is for
1998 or 1999. In most instances the national government is re-
sponsible for the entire public investment. But in Australia, Ca-
nada, and the United States, the figures represent the combined
40. See LSC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6.
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TABLE 3. COMPARATIVE CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES
INVESTMENTS41 (Nations ranked by relative share of GNP invested
in publicly-funded civil legal services-lowest to highest)
Total U.S. Civil
Legal Services How Many Times
Nation (or Investment, If U S. Greater Is This
political Per Capita Invested As Much of Nation's Civil Legal
subdivision of Total Government Civil Legal Civil Legal Services Its GNP As This Services Investment
nation, e.g., Investment in Civil Services Investment Per Nation in Civil Than The U S.
province Legal Services (US$ Investment US$10,00 of Legal Services (US$ Investment (% of
state) million) (US$) GNP (US$) billion) GNP)
United States
(includes
federal, state,
local govits,
& IOLTA
expenditures) $600 (pop. = 270
(FY 1998) million) $2.25 $0.70 $0.6 Not available
Germany $390 (pop. = 80
(1996) million) $4.86 $1L90 $1.6 2.5
France $270 (pop, = 59
(1994) million) $4.50 $1,90 $1,6 2.5
Australia (FY Not Each province has
1998-99) Not available available its own program Not available Not available
New South $31 (pop, = 6
Wales million) $5.12 $2.75 $2.3 4
Canada (FY Not Each province has
1998-99) Not available available its own program Not available Not available
$52 (pop. - 7.3
Quebec million) $7.07 $3.50 $3.0 5
$82 (pop. = I] 5
Ontario million) $7,06 $3.60 $3,0 5
British $32 (pop. = 4
Columbia million) $7,80 $4.00 $3.5 6
Netherlands $150 (pop, = 15.5
(1998) million) $9.70 $4.20 $&.5 6
New Zealand $27 (pop. = 3.8
(FY 1998-99) million) $7.10 $5.10 $4.25 7
$2,000
England $1,350 $39.60 GrossS17.00 $14.2 23.5
(1999) (pop. = 53 million) $26.00 Net=$12.00 $10A 17
SOuiRxs oF LEGAL AID EXPENDiURE DATA: AUSTRALIA-LEGAL Ato CoMMissioN OF NEw SolrrH WALS, Financial Overview.
Program Expenditure Chart, in ANNUAL REPORT 1999. CAnsA-Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Table 5-Legal Aid
Expenditures by Object, Legal Aid in Canada: Resource and Caseload Data Tables, in LEGAL AD SURVE' 1998-99. Catalogue
No. 85F0D28 (2000). ENGL.o--LoRD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTME';T, Table 10.7 -Legal Aid Expenditures: Receipts and
Payments, 1999 JUDICIAL STATSTiCs - ENGLAND AND WALES FOR THE YEAR 1999, Catalog No. CM4786 (2000). FRANCE-
NATiONAL RSOURCE CIENTER FOR CoNsuMEtRs OF LEGAL SERVICES, France Beefs Up On Legal Aid, in LEu.AL PLAN LETTER (Jan.
15, 1993) (using projected figures for 1994). GEr.uANv--Gerhard Danneman, Access tofitstice an Angl-Geeman Comparison,
tbl, 5, 2 EUROPEAN Puauc LAw 271 (1996). NETHEmeRLNs-Peter van den Biggelaar, Legal Aid in the Netherlands, in Legal Aid
in the New Millennium 74 (using statistics for 1998). Ncw ZEALAN--LEGAL AD BOARD, Appendix 1: Overview of Legal Aid
Costs and Recoveries, in ANNUAL REPORT FoR YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1999, 33 (1999). UNITED STATEs-LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION, A.NNUAL REPORT 1999 (2000). Sources of GNP and Per Capita GNP: WoRLD BANK, 2000 WoRD
DEVELOPMENT INDicAToRS ANo WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICAsTORS DATABASE (2000). EXCHANGE RATES: Chart uses exchange
rates in effect in year of legal aid expenditure, e.g., 1996 exchange rate for Germany and 1999 exchange rate for England,
etc...
41. National Equal Justice Library, International Legal Aid Collections (visited Oct.
15, 2000) <http://www.equaljusticeupdate.org> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal). The chart on the website is updated periodically, as more recent
statistical data becomes available. Readers interested remaining current on these
statistical comparisons should visit the website, which also contains information about
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expenditures of all levels of government-national, state, and lo-
cal-which contribute funds to civil legal services for lower in-
come people.
As can be seen, other industrial democracies invest from 2.5
times as much of their GNP as the United States (France and
Germany) to seventeen times as much (England) to provide ac-
cess to justice for their lower income population. To illustrate
what this means in concrete terms, the chart sets forth how
much United States governments-federal, state, and local-
would have to invest in civil legal services for the poor to match
the current investment in such services by these other industrial
democracies. We would have to raise our present combined
public investment of approximately US$600,000,000 (600 mil-
lion) to US$1,600,000,000 (1.6 billion) if we were to match
France and Germany, despite the fact the courts in both of these
countries use an inquisitorial process which is less dependent on
lawyers. To match the three major Canadian provinces federal,
state, and local governments in the United States would have to
combine to invest something over US$3,000,000,000 (three bil-
lion) a year in civil legal services, to match the Netherlands
US$3,500,000,000 (3.5 billion), or to match New Zealand
US$4,250,000,000 (4.25 billion). Finally, if the United States
were to demonstrate as great a financial commitment to equal
access to justice as England our federal, state, and local govern-
ments would be investing over US$10,000,000,000 (ten billion) a
year on civil legal services for our nation's lower income popula-
tion.
Other comparisons are even more striking. At this point,
government-paid legal aid fees represent more than 12% of the
total gross income earned by English solicitors-virtually all of it
for advice and representation in civil cases. 42 (Over half of bar-
risters' income also comes from government-paid legal aid fees,
but much of this is for criminal cases.) To place this statistic in
context, 12% of the annual earnings of American lawyers would
exceed US$16,000,000,000 (sixteen billion) at the present time.
the legal aid programs of a number of countries, judicial decisions from different
nations affecting equal access to justice, and lists of publications held in the National
Equal justice Library related to legal aid developments in other parts of the world.
42. Mike Hope, Expenditure on Legal Seruices, Lord Chancellor's Department, Re-
search Secretariat (visited Oct. 15, 2000) <http://www.open.gov.uk/research/1997/
1997es.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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(In 1997, gross revenues of U.S. law firms totaled
US$133,000,000,000 (133 billion),43 and have been on a steep
upward incline for two decades.") Thus if the United States
were to devote as large a percentage of its total societal expendi-
tures on lawyers as England does to government-paid legal civil
legal services for lower income people, this nation's govern-
ments would be spending well in excess of US$16,000,000,000
(sixteen billion) a year on those services.
Meanwhile if the United States maintained the same ratio as
England between public expenditures on the courts and ex-
penditures on services required to effectively access those courts,
we would be spending over US$23,000,000,000 (twenty-three bil-
lion) a year on civil legal services for lower income U.S. citizens.
That is, in 1999 the English government spent £535,000,000
(535 million) (US$882,000,000 (882 million)) on its court sys-
tem45 and £820,000,000 (820 million) (US$1,350,000,000 (1.35
billion) on civil legal services for lower income people seeking to
access that court system.46
Where does the United States stand? Accurate national ex-
penditure figures are hard to come by for America's complex
array of federal, state, county, and municipal courts. So I use the
nation's largest state, California, as representative. In this state,
with a population two-thirds the size of England, combined fed-
eral and state expenditures on civil legal services hover around
US$ 70,000,000 (seventy million). Meantime, California's judi-
cial budget, now funded almost entirely by the state government,
43. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1999 tbl. 1301 (119th ed. 1999).
44. Id. In 1990, law firm gross receipts were US$97,600,000,000 (97.6 billion).
Five years later in 1995, that figure had grown to US$116,000,000,000 (116 billion), a
year later in 1996 to US$124,700,000,000 (124.7 billion). Id. At this pace, law firm
gross receipts may well exceed US$150,000,000,000 (150 billion) in 2000, while the LSC
budget lags at US$300,000,000 (300 million) and total government expenditures on
civil legal services for the poor linger in the US$600,000,000 (600 million) range. Id.
45. LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR, THE COURT SERVICE ANNUAL REPORT 1998-1999, 40
(The Stationery Office, 1999).
46. LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT, Table 10.7-Legal Aid Expenditures: Re-
ceipts and Payments, 1999 JUDICIAL STATISTICS - ENGLAND AND WALES FOR THE YEAR
1999, Catalog No. CM4786 (2000). This is the net governmental expenditure on civil
legal services exclusive of private funds such as required contributions from clients and
parties who lose to legally-aided clients. Id. The gross expenditure on civil legal ser-
vices for lower income Englishmen is £1,275,000,000 (1.275 billion) (US$2,000,000,000
(two billion)). Id.
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is US$2,300,000,000 (2.3 billion). Where the Quebec civil legal
services budget is over 60% the size of the province's judicial
budget and the U.K civil legal services budget is 154% the size of
its judicial budget, in California the civil legal services budget is
only 3% the size of the state's judicial budget.
Thus, to the extent California is representative of U.S. juris-
dictions, governments in this nation are spending 3% as much
on civil legal services as they are on their court systems. Mean-
while, England is spending 154% as much on these services so
essential to equal access as it does on its courts. Thus, to match
England on this measure, U.S. governments would have to invest
over US$23,000,000,000 (twenty-three billion) a year on civil le-
gal services for the poor.
While England, once again, is far ahead of any other coun-
try in its financial commitment to equal access to justice, it ap-
pears other countries also may maintain a very different ratio
between legal aid funding and court funding than we do in the
U.S. Thus far, I have only been able to obtain reliable statistics
about court funding from one other jurisdiction-Quebec Pro-
ince, Canada. But that province invests over 60% as much on
civil legal services for the poor as it does on its courts, compared
once again to that 3% figure in the U.S. If the U.S. spent 60% as
much on civil legal services as it does on the courts, combined
government expenditures on those services would exceed
US$9,000,000,000 (nine billion).
At this point I should hasten to add I am not proposing the
United States raise its annual public investment in civil legal ser-
vices for the poor to twenty-three billion or sixteen billion or
even nine billion dollars. I am, however, suggesting our current
level of investment is absurdly low. In this vital area of equal
access to justice, we are truly an "underdeveloped country."
II. JUSTICE IN "TRIAGE" IS NOT EQUAL JUSTICE-WHAT
THE LACK OF A RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND
ADEQUATE FUNDING HAVE MEANT FOR
POOR PEOPLE IN THE
UNITED STATES
The vast disparity in legal services funding puts the United
States and England at opposite ends of a very wide spectrum.
The disparity also means the two countries are at very different
[Vol. 24:S83
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steps on the road toward a society which truly offers all its citi-
zens equal justice and thus face very different problems. To bor-
row a health services analogy, the United States is in a "triage"
situation-indeed one of "extreme triage"-trying to pick the rel-
ative few poor people to which its limited legal service resource
will be able to offer a free lawyer. On the other hand, England,
and to a lesser extent some of the other countries reflected on
the above chart, is facing the problem of "cost containment"-
what the health care industry in this country might call the move
from fee for service to "managed care." For England, the issue is
how to keep costs down while continuing to give all its citizens
the right to equal justice the nation seeks to guarantee.
To illustrate what I mean by the United States being forced
to engage in "triage," let me take you to my home county of Los
Angeles, California. It is the most populous U.S. county with
over 10,000,000 (ten million) people and almost 2,000,000 (two
million) of those are poor in the sense they are financially eligi-
ble for civil legal services. Los Angeles County has over 40,000
lawyers, yet there are fewer than a hundred government-funded
legal services lawyers to meet the legal needs of that 2,000,000
(two million) poor people.
By analogy, the dimensions of the problems legal services
lawyers face is similar to expecting a hundred doctors to take
care of all the health care needs of two million people. Imagine
what you would do if handed the assignment of putting together
a health care program with only a hundred doctors to somehow
make this population of two million healthier. It is likely you
would emphasize "public health" measures such as mass vaccina-
tions calculated to reduce deadly diseases dramatically across the
entire population and focus other resources on the treatment of
life-threatening conditions like heart disease and cancer, before
worrying about patients with colds and backaches. By so doing,
you would produce the most improvement in death rates and
overall health in that population group, as opposed to randomly
treating whatever complaints might be brought to your tiny
health service by the one in ten or one in twenty sick people
your handful of doctors might be able to see.
For similar reasons, when we can only put a hundred law-
yers in a community with two million poor people, it makes
sense to try the rough equivalent of a "public health" approach.
A class action or a favorable legislative change is like a mass inoc-
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ulation program against a disease that infects thousands every
year because it can improve the lives of thousands at a compara-
tively minimal cost. For example, if thousands of poor people in
the community are being evicted in retaliation for reporting
housing code violations to the authorities, the logical course of
action is to seek legislation that would ban retaliatory evictions
or perhaps a class action aimed at achieving the same goal. A
favorable appellate precedent can do the same, but is also often
similar to treatment of heart disease or cancer because it tends
to address the most serious legal conditions the poor experi-
ence. In essence, the absence of a legally enforceable right to
counsel and the resultant shortage of resources virtually compels
U.S. legal services programs to practice "triage" and makes it
most sensible to emphasize measures like appellate litigation,
class actions, and legislative advocacy.
Unfortunately, in large part because U.S. legal services law-
yers were so effective with these "triage" strategies over the years,
the U.S. Congress has deprived them of some of their most effec-
tive measures for improving the "public legal health" of the
poor. Because of restrictions the U.S. Congress imposed in
1995, the U.S. federal government refuses to allow the local legal
services agencies to use class actions and legislative advocacy to
address community-wide problems. Think of the outcry if the
government said public funds could not be used to vaccinate the
poor against polio or tuberculosis, or doctors paid through
Medicaid could no longer treat heart disease or cancer among
the poor. Yet this is the functional equivalent of what the 1995
amendments to the Legal Services Corporation Act have done to
legal services for the poor.4 7
Part of an ongoing struggle in the United States is to restore
the ability of U.S. legal services to effectively practice the "triage"
that the miniscule supply of legal services resources has elevated
to a necessity. Taking the problems of poor people one client at
a time simply is not a viable strategy when you only have enough
lawyers to help a small percentage of those clients.
Despite the current state of civil legal services in the United
States, the nation has high quality lawyers delivering high quality
legal representation to the poor in this country-the relative few
they can with present resource, that is. I continue to be amazed
47. Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.SC.A. § 2996 (1995).
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by the dedication, imagination, and professionalism of so many
legal services lawyers in the United States, including those who
appear before the California appellate courts. In addition, they
have become experienced practitioners of "triage." In that
sense, they have much to offer emerging democracies and devel-
oping countries that lack legal resources or resources in general.
In a few U.S. cities, like New York, civil legal services agen-
cies also benefit from the generosity of the local bar, founda-
tions, and other private charities, which augment the govern-
ment funding. To the extent justice depends on charity, how-
ever, it is destined to be unequal. To illustrate, because of an
unusual concentration of private funding, the diverse array of
legal services agencies that serve San Francisco's 100,000 poor
people have four times the resources per poor person as do
those serving the two million poor people in Los Angeles county.
If the United States had public funding at the level San Fran-
cisco does largely through private charity, the United States
would be a lot closer to some of the Western European and U.K.
Commonwealth countries that I have discussed this evening.
Unfortunately, the United States does not come even close to
the level of funding found in San Francisco.
Even assuming the United States increased the national in-
vestment by ten fold or so and thus approached meeting the full
civil legal needs of the poor, a judicially enforceable right would
still be essential. The LSC and similar programs must be counted
for what they are-a form of legislative charity. Like other forms
of charity, this variety can be withdrawn or modified by the bene-
factor at any time.
The experience of legislative charity for legal services in the
United States over the past two decades has not been encour-
aging. Time and again, the American Bar Association and
state and local bar associations have been forced to rally in
support of the LSC program when it appeared the LSC pro-
gram might be abolished or subjected to some untenable ex-
clusions and limitations on the services it could provide. Un-
fortunately, the organized bar and other allies of equal justice
were not able to defeat the 1995 restriction described earlier.
As a consequence, the present Legal Services Corporation Act
contains many serious limitations on which kinds of poor
people can be served and what kinds of services lawyers can
give to those they do represent.
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The existing restrictions in the Legal Services Corporation
Act are enough in themselves to establish an urgent need for a
judicially protected right. Beyond that need, however, is the
threat the U.S. Congress might enact even more punitive limita-
tions or abolish the program entirely. These possibilities will
haunt the LSC and forty million U.S. citizens for so long as the
existence of civil representation for the poor continues to de-
pend upon the charitable impulses of both U.S. legislative bod-
ies.
III. A POSSIBLE GLOBALIZATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
VALUES AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EQUAL
ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES
Returning to Judge Sweet's call for a civil Gideon4" in the
United States, I will not attempt to repeat his careful dissection
of the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Lassiter v. Department of
Social Serices,4 9 which looms as the main obstacle to the creation
of a right to counsel in civil cases in this country. I will only
quote his conclusion: "Because of the vital interest held by the
government in a just outcome, and the extremely high risk of
injustice where adequate counsel is not available, I propose that
a right to counsel should arise whenever access to the justice sys-
tem is warranted."50
With a clever jiujitsu move, Judge Sweet turns the Lassiter
majority's rationale against their conclusion. He says to the Su-
preme Court, in essence, "Apply the Lassiter three-part test.
Please. But apply it honestly--the words of that test as they
would be understood by almost anyone in this society, lawyer or
layperson. And apply it to the typical case in the civil courts. If
you do, you will find a constitutional right to counsel in civil
cases."
I am a state courtjudge, and will leave it to federal judges to
fight it out over the meaning of this Supreme Court opinion. I
will not ask whether Lassiter was rightly decided under the
United States' existing constitutional jurisprudence. Instead I
will ask a different, some might say more "global" question. Will
48. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
49. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
50. Sweet, supra note 2, at 927.
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there come a time when the issue addressed in Lassiter is no
longer framed solely by the precedents and constitutional values
generated by the U.S. Supreme Court, but also takes account of
a broader global consensus about the meaning of fundamental
concepts like a "fair hearing" or "due process," "equality before
the law" or "equal protection of the laws?" In other words, when,
if ever, will the U.S. Supreme Court begin looking at the deci-
sions of the high courts of other nations and how they have in-
terpreted constitutional concepts-and indeed language-also
found in our constitution?
For some, this may seem an impossibility. And based on
past experience it does seem pretty remote. After all, the U.S.
Supreme Court managed to decide Lassiter in 1981 without even
mentioning the contrary decision of the European Court on
Human Rights in Airey v. Ireland, an opinion filed two years ear-
lier and declaring a much broader right to counsel in civil cases
covering a population even larger than the United States. One
likewise would struggle to find any U.S. Supreme Court opinion
over the past two centuries deciding any constitutional issue
which even bothered to discuss the high court opinions of other
countries interpreting those nations' constitutions.
Yet just this year, some light appeared flickering at the end
of the tunnel. At an international conference the World Bank
sponsored in June, 2000, two justices of the U.S. Supreme Court
spoke in terms suggesting they, at least, saw value in supreme
courts of different nations and jurisdictions looking at each
others' opinions. In her speech to this assemblage ofjudges and
lawyers from all over the world, Justice Sandra Day O'Conner
urged: "I would like to see written opinions of high courts
around the globe, written, interpreted in several languages and
put on Web sites so that the world can see what you're doing."51
One would reasonably assume the "world" expected to see-and
presumably consider-these foreign high court opinions, many
of them translated from another language, includes Justice
O'Conner and the other members of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Of possibly even greater significance, Justice Arthur Ken-
nedy implicitly promised to pay attention to relevant decisions of
the European Court on Human Rights, if only the judges of that
51. Supreme Court Justices Promote Rule of Law in Other Countries, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
June 6, 2000
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court would begin writing opinions that were fully reasoned. In
his speech, Justice Kennedy called on that court to "begin writ-
ing decisions which have the capacity and the power to inspire
and persuade." 2 Once again, presumably Justice Kennedy and
his colleagues are among those who could be inspired or at least
persuaded by opinions of the European Court on Human Rights
which satisfied his test.
I have not had occasion to study other decisions of the Eu-
ropean Court on Human Rights enough to know whetherJustice
Kennedy's criticism of that Court's typical work product is cor-
rect. Perhaps there is a tendency, as there is in some of our own
state courts, to announce the result but only provide a shallow
rationale justifying that result. But if this is the general pattern
in the European Court on Human Rights, then its opinion in
Airey v. Ireland is a notable exception. I already have quoted
some of the highlights from that opinion, presenting some of
the reasoning and policy considerations supporting its decision.
To further capture the flavor of the opinion, however, let us ex-
amine its explanation for why counsel is so essential to any liti-
gant, rich or poor, in the regular courts-an explanation which
stresses many of the same reasons the U.S. Supreme Court re-
cited in Gideon v Wainwright to support the right to counsel in
criminal cases.
After pointing out the absurdity of considering ineffective
access to the courtroom satisfies the constitutional requirement
of a "fair hearing,"53 the European Court turned to the critical
question-whether effective access in civil cases requires repre-
sentation by a lawyer.
It must therefore be ascertained whether Mrs. Airey's ap-
pearance before the High Court without the assistance of a
lawyer would be effective, in the sense of whether she would
be able to present her case properly and satisfactorily.
It seems certain to the court that the applicant would be
at a disadvantage if her husband were represented by a lawyer
and she were not. Quite apart from this eventuality, it is not
realistic, in the Court's opinion to suppose that, in litigation
of this nature, the applicant could effectively conduct her
52. Id. Interestingly, in this same speech Justice Kennedy, praised legal aid pro-
grams for the poor as providing a "necessary safety valve for the stability of govern-
ment." Id.
53. See language in text quoted at footnote, supra Fn32.
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own case, despite the assistance which, as was stressed by the
[Irish] Government, the judge affords to parties acting in per-
son.
A specialist in Irish family law... regards the High Court
as the least accessible court... by reason of the fact that 'the
procedure for instituting proceedings . .. is complex' . . .
Furthermore, litigation of this kind, in addition to involv-
ing complicated points of law, necessitates proof of adultery,
unnatural practices or, as in the present case, cruelty; to es-
tablish the facts, expert evidence may have to be tendered
and witnesses may have to be found, called and examined.
[It is] most improbable that a person in Mrs. Airey's posi-
tion.., can effectively present his or her own case. This view
is corroborated [by the fact) that in each of the 255 judicial
separation proceedings initiated in Ireland in the period
from January 1972 to December 1978, without exception, the
petitioner was represented by a lawyer.
The court concludes from the foregoing the possibility
to appear in person before the High Court does not provide
the applicant with an effective right of access.54
As the European Court on Human Rights observed about
civil litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court in Gideonjustified its dec-
laration of a constitutional right to counsel in criminal cases by
stressing the fact most people of means hire lawyers when facing
trial in the criminal courts55 and that the other side in such liti-
gation usually has counsel.56  And like the Airey court, the
Gideon court utilized the judges' own familiarity with what is re-
quired to find and present evidence in a courtroom to draw the
conclusion a lawyer's assistance was necessary if the defendant
were to have an effective defense.5" But the Airey court actually
54. Airey v. Ireland, Eur. Court H.R., Judgment of Oct. 1979, Series A No. 32, 12-
14.
55. "[Tlhere are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire
the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses." Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. at 344.
56. "Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's
interest in an orderly society.... That government hires lawyers to prosecute and de-
fendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries."
57. Id.
[R]eason and reflection,require us to recognize that in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to
us to be an obvious truth.... The right to be heard would be, in many cases,
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went further then the U.S. Supreme Court in justifying the need
for counsel in civil cases. It also considered expert testimony
demonstrating the substantive law and procedure were so com-
plex a layperson could not represent herself "properly and satis-
factorily."
Since Gideon is fairly typical of the "capacity and the power
to inspire and to persuade" found in U.S. Supreme Court opin-
ions, it appears difficult to discount Airey v. Ireland on that score.
When, as in Airey, a decision of the European Court on Human
Rights-or any national supreme court-satisfies Justice Ken-
nedy's test and addresses common constitutional language or
comparable constitutional concepts, I submit it deserves serious
consideration by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Once the U.S. Supreme Court accepts the notion it should
pay some attention to how the supreme courts of other nations
and continents have construed constitutional values we share in
common, it will be difficult to deny the growing "global" consen-
sus among jurisdictions with written constitutions that one of
those core constitutional values is a right to counsel in civil cases.
We have already discussed the Swiss 58 and German Supreme
Courts"9 , along with the Airey decision60 of the European Court
on Human Rights. These courts saw no alternative but to re-
quire governments to provide free counsel to indigent civil liti-
gants if they were to satisfy the constitutional guarantee of a "fair
hearing" or "equality before the law" for those too poor to afford
their own lawyers. Then just last year and closer to home, the
Supreme Court of Canada, in a case closely paralleling the facts
of Lassiter, also found a constitutional right to counsel in the
of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even
the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determin-
ing for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with
the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evi-
dence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill
and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a per-
fect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceed-
ings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
Id. at 344-345.
58. See supra text accompanying note 25.
59. See supra text accompanying note 28.
60. See supra text accompanying note 33.
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"fair hearing" requirement of that nation's first written constitu-
tion, the rather new "Charter of Rights and Freedoms."61
Like Lassiter, the Canadian case, J.G. v. New Brunswick,
6 2
arose when the government sought to deprive a mother of her
children. In the Canadian case, however, the province of New
Brunswick only sought to continue its custody over the children
for another six months. Had the government tried to perma-
nently deprive the mother of her parental rights-the stakes in-
volved in Lassiter-the New Brunswick legal aid law would have
provided the woman with free counsel. Furthermore, even in a
temporary deprivation case like this, in most other Canadian
provinces the mother would have been entitled to legal aid as a
matter of statutory law. But New Brunswick, one of the least gen-
erously funded legal aid programs in Canada,6" denied free
counsel to poor mothers where they only stood to lose custody
for another six months.
I will pass over the rather convoluted procedural history of
the case, irrelevant for our purposes, and report the Canadian
Supreme Court ultimately held the New Brunswick government
was constitutionally required to supply indigent mothers with
free counsel whenever it proposed to assume or maintain cus-
tody of their children-permanently or temporarily. As the
principal opinion, authored by the Chief Justice Lamer, ex-
plains: "The protection of Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms is not restricted to purely criminal or penal
matters. The right to security of the person protects both the
physical and psychological integrity of the individual from state
actions. . ."
Chief Justice Lamer then turned to the critical issue: what
61. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms). Canada adopted this Charter, similar in purpose and scope to the "Bill of
Rights" amendments to the U.S. Constitution, in 1982.
62. [1999] N.B.R.2d 305 (Can.).
63. CANAxiAN CENTRE FOR JUSTICE STATIsTICs, Table 5-Legal Aid Expenditures by
Object, Legal Aid in Canada: Resource and Caseload Data Tables, in LEGAL AID SURVEY
1998-99, Catalogue No. 85F0028 (2000). New Brunswick expends less than $ 2.00 per
capita on civil legal services for lower income people, compared to $7.06 per capita in
Ontario and $7.80 in British Columbia. Id. In 1996, the population of New Brunswick
was 738,135. Of this, 375,200 (50.8%) were women and 362,935 (49.2%) were men. In
comparison with the previous census of 1991, the total population of the province was
723,900, thus the growth was 2.0%. Id.
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does the Charter guarantee when the state files a custody appli-
cation?
Section 7 guarantees every parent the right to a fair hear-
ing when the state seeks to obtain custody of their chil-
dren.... A fair hearing requires that the parent has the op-
portunity to present her or his case effectively. Effective par-
ticipation enhances the judge's ability to make an accurate
determination. Here, the statutory scheme allows a parent to
present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and make repre-
sentations but does not provide funds for an indigent parent
to retain counsel. In the circumstances of this case, taking
into account the seriousness of the interests at stake, the com-
plexity of the proceedings and the capacities ofJ.G., the right
to a fair hearing required the government to provide coun-
sel. 6
4
J.G. v. New Brunswick, like the constitutional right to counsel
cases issued by the Swiss and German Supreme Courts, and Airey
v. Ireland from the European Court on Human Rights, seems to
spring from a fundamental precept underlying language found
in every written constitution on the face of the earth. I know of
no constitution-or equivalent legally enforceable "bill of rights"
or "declaration of rights" or "charter of rights" or "convention of
64. J.G. v. New Brunswick [1999] N.B.R.2d 305 (Can.) (emphasis added). Signifi-
cantly, Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is narrower than the
equivalent due process clause of the U.S. Constitution in two respects. First, Section 7
only purports to protect life, liberty, and "security of the person" while the due process
clause includes "property" along with life and liberty as interests to enjoy procedural
protections. Second, Section 7 does not mention the entitlement to a "fair hearing"
specifically, but instead provides Canadians have "the right not to be deprived [of life,
liberty, or security of the person] except in accordance with the principles of funda-
mental justice." CA'. CoNsT. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms), §7.
In a separate, concurring opinion, justice L'Heureux-Dube found an additional
provision of the Charter supported the right to counsel in this case.
This case also implicates issues of equality guaranteed by s. 15 of the Charter
which should be considered in interpreting the scope and content of the
rights guaranteed by s. 7.... Child protection proceedings disproportionately
affect women and especially single mothers. . . . Issues of fairness in child
protection hearings have particular importance for members of disadvantaged
and vulnerable groups, particularly visible minorities, aboriginal people and
the disabled. Thus, it is important to ensure that the analysis of s. 7 in this
case takes into account the principles and purposes of the equality guarantee
in promoting equal benefit of the law and ensuring that the law responds to
disadvantaged individuals and groups whose protection is at the heart of s.15.
[1999] N.B.R.2d 305 (Can.) (L'Heureux-Dube, J., concurring).
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rights"-that doesn't guarantee litigants a "fair hearing" or
"equality" among citizens when enforcing their legal rights in
the civil courts. Often these constitutional documents guarantee
both a fair hearing and equality before the courts. Moreover, at
this point the high courts of industrial democracies containing
over 500 million people have determined poor people cannot
have a fair hearing or equality in the civil courts unless govern-
ment supplies them with counsel.
What is this fundamental precept that finds expression in
every written constitution and now seems to be emerging as a
global constitutional value?
This international conference highlights the fact that the
highest courts of other jurisdictions-Germany, Switzerland, and
all of Western Europe-have found a right to counsel in civil liti-
gation for the poor in the same constitutional language that
somehow has proved insufficient in the United States. More im-
portantly, the right to counsel these Western European courts
declared flowed naturally from a fundamental precept shared by
all democracies, including the United States. This precept is
found in the political theory of the social contract, which wad so
influential with the men who wrote the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, the U.S. Constitution, and created the U.S. system of gov-
ernment. At the very core of this theory is the understanding no
citizen would give up the natural right to settle disputes through
force unless the sovereign offers a peaceful alternative in which
that person has a fair chance to prevail if in the right. Society, in
turn, breaches this social contract when they favor one citizen
over the other because its forums require a lawyer that one citi-
zen cannot afford. The disfavored person cannot be presumed
to have agreed to submit to an unjust sovereign. Thus, equal
justice is the essential underpinning of the entire society, not
just Western European or U.K. Commonwealth societies, but any
that purports to be rest on the consent of the governed.
The case for the right to counsel in civil cases is universal
and transcends borders, continents, and national constitutions.
This theory found modern expression in a Resolution the Com-
mittee of Ministers of the Council of Europe65 passed in 1978, a
65. LEGAL AFFAIRS, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, LEGAL AID AND ADVICE: RESOLUTION 78(8)
ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ON 2 MARCH 1978
AND EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, 5-6.
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year before the European Court on Human Rights decided Airey
v. Ireland. The Ministers declared in part:
Considering that the right of access to justice and to a
fair hearing, as guaranteed under Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, is an essential feature of any
democratic society; ...
[T]he provision of legal aid should no longer be re-
garded as a charity to indigent persons but as an obligation of
the community as a whole; ...
No one should be prevented by economic obstacles from
pursuing or defending his right before any court determining
civil, commercial, administrative, social or physical matters.
66
It is time-long past time-for the United States to join the
growing international consensus that words like "due process,"
"fair hearing," "equal protection of the laws," and "equality
before the law," all express a universal principle-a right to
equal justice to be enjoyed by everyone. And, as the European
Court on Human Rights pointed out, if this right is to be "practi-
cal and effective," and not merely "theoretical or illusory," then
for those unable to afford counsel, the right to equal justice
must include the right to a lawyer supplied by government.
Why is this so important? As the European Ministers said in
1978, it is "an essential feature of any democratic society." In-
deed, without this right a nation's poor people are less than full
citizens and that nation is less than a true democracy. They can-
not even enforce the other rights their votes may have won them
in the legislatures.
It is the failure of the United States' past we did not recog-
nize this obvious truth, so deeply embedded in our national ide-
als, long ago. It is the tragedy of the present we remain insular
and smug about our nation's superiority in all things related to
'justice," while millions of poor U.S. citizens are denied this pre-
cious right. It is the hope of the future the United States will
finally open its eyes and embrace the "practical and effective"
right to equal justice most Western democracies now guarantee.
When that day comes-and it may come soon-millions of U.S.
citizens will, for the first time, truly have their day in court.
66. Id.
